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1 Introduction
A standard rationing problem is an allocation problem in which each individ-
ual in a group of agents has a claim on a quantity of some (perfectly divisible)
resource (e.g., money) and the available amount of this resource is insuffi-
cient to satisfy all claims. Assignment of taxes, bankruptcy situations and the
distribution of emergency supplies are examples of rationing problems. Stan-
dard rationing problems have been widely studied in the literature.1 Since
ancient times, several solutions to this simple problem have been proposed
(see Aumann and Maschler, 1985; O’Neill, 1982), based mainly on equalizing
gains or losses from claims, or by using a proportional yardstick.
Standard rationing analysis considers claims to be the only relevant in-
formation affecting the final distribution. Recently, several authors have
studied complex rationing situations in which not only claims, but also in-
dividual rights or other entitlements, affect the final distribution. Hougaard
et al. (2012, 2013a,b) and Pulido et al. (2002, 2008) introduce baselines or
references based on past experience or exogenous entitlements in order to re-
fine the claims of agents. Indeed, Hougaard et al. (2013a) consider baselines
as consolidated rights represented by positive numbers. The authors propose
that agents are first assigned their baselines truncated by the claims before
allocating the resulting deficit, or surplus, using a standard rationing rule in
which the claims are the truncated baselines (in the case of a deficit) or the
gap between each claim and its respective truncated baseline (in the case of
a surplus).
In the above models, the references or baselines can be interpreted as
objective evaluations of the real needs of agents that usually differ from their
claims. They can also be understood as a tentative allocation becoming
upper or lower bounds for the final distribution depending on whether they
are feasible or not. In the present paper we consider exogenous information
(namely ex-ante conditions) different from claims, but from a completely
1These problems are also known in the literature as problems of adjudicating conflicting
claims (see the surveys undertaken by Thomson (2003, 2015)).
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distinct point of view from the baseline interpretation. The ex-ante condition
of an agent reflects his initial stock or endowment2 of the corresponding
resource. Hence, in contrast to baselines, ex-ante conditions are not tentative
allocations, but aim to reveal inequalities between agents that might suggest
payoff compensations in favour of some agents and to the detriment of others.
Next examples make clear this point.
Imagine there are n agents and each agent i has an initial stock of resource;
let us denote it by δi ≥ 0. Furthermore, let us suppose that there is scarcity
and that the available amount r > 0 of resource to be currently distributed
does not cover the claims of agents. It seems unfair to treat equally agents
with different initial stocks, even in the case of having equal claims. In this
paper, we propose to prioritize an agent with a small stock with respect to
another agent with a larger stock by compensating as much as possible the
gap between initial stocks. Consider, for instance, a distribution of irrigation
water among a group of farmers in a drought period. Imagine that each
farmer has a reservoir to collect rainwater, but the current level (stock of
water) of the reservoirs are not all equal. Even in the case that the crop
extension owned by each farmer is equal, the distribution of water should be
affected by inequalities between the water reserves of farmers.
Another situation where ex-ante conditions between agents arise is in
the distribution of grants or subsidies by a public institution. Many times
the distribution process takes into account the net worth of agents in order
to reach a fairer allocation. Notice that this net worth might be positive
or negative (in case debts are larger than assets). A real example of an
allocation problem that considers ex-ante conditions is the distribution of
scholarships, where allocation criteria are often related to the family income.
In this paper we propose a generalization of two well-known rules defined
for standard rationing problems: the constrained equal awards rule (CEA)
and the constrained equal losses rule (CEL). We name these generalized
2This endowment can be positive (in most situations) but it might be negative (imagine
we are distributing money and the net worth of an agent is negative).
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rules as the generalized equal awards rule (GEA) and the generalized equal
losses rule (GEL), respectively. We show that these rules are dual of each
other in a proper sense. Obviously, the generalizations are consistent with the
CEA rule and the CEL rule respectively, when ex-ante conditions are equal
for all agents. Once defined the rules, two characterizations of the GEA rule
are provided. The first one adapts and extends to the new framework the
characterization of the CEA rule given by Herrero and Villar (2001). The
second one is based on new and specific axioms for the ex-ante conditions
model. Based on the corresponding dual properties, we also obtain two
characterization of the GEL rule.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce the main notations, we describe a rationing problem with ex-ante
conditions and we define the GEA and the GEL rules. In Section 3, we
carry out the axiomatic analysis of the GEA rule and in Section 4 we use
the duality of rules and properties to characterize the GEL rule. In Section
5, we conclude.
2 Rationing problems and rules with ex-ante
conditions
Let us first introduce some notations and recall the definition of a standard
rationing problem. We denote by N the set of natural numbers that we
identify with the universe of potential agents, and by N the family of all
finite subsets of N. Given S ∈ N , we denote by s the cardinality of S.
Given a finite subset of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} ∈ N , a standard ra-
tioning problem for N is to distribute r ≥ 0 among these n agents with
claims c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ RN+ . It is assumed that r ≤
∑
i∈N ci since other-
wise no rationing problem exists. We denote a standard rationing problem
by the pair (r, c) ∈ R+ × RN+ .
A feasible allocation for (r, c) is represented by a vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈
RN such that 0 ≤ xi ≤ ci and
∑
i∈N xi = r, where xi represents the payoff
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associated to agent i ∈ N . A rationing rule associates a unique allocation
to each standard rationing problem. Two well-known rationing rules are the
constrained equal awards rule (CEA) and the constrained equal losses rule
(CEL).
Definition 1. (CEA). For any standard rationing problem (r, c) ∈ R+×RN+
the CEA rule is defined as
CEAi(r, c) = min{ci, λ}, for all i ∈ N,
where λ ∈ R+ satisfies
∑
i∈N min{ci, λ} = r.
Definition 2. (CEL). For any standard rationing problem (r, c) ∈ R+×RN+
the CEL rule is defined as
CELi(r, c) = max{0, ci − λ}, for all i ∈ N,
where λ ∈ R+ satisfies
∑
i∈N max{0, ci − λ} = r.
The aim of a rationing problem with ex-ante conditions is to fairly dis-
tribute an amount of a scarce resource taking into account the inequalities
in the ex-ante conditions.
Definition 3. Let N ∈ N be a finite subset of agents. A rationing problem
with ex-ante conditions for N is a triple (r, c, δ), where r ∈ R+ is the amount
of resource, c ∈ RN+ is the vector of claims, such that r ≤
∑
i∈N ci, and
δ ∈ RN is the vector of ex-ante conditions.
We denote byRN the set of all rationing problems with ex-ante conditions
and agent set N , and by R = ∪N∈NRN the family of all rationing problems
with ex-ante conditions.
The definition of an allocation rule for these problems does not differ
essentially from the standard definition.
Definition 4. A generalized rationing rule is a function F that associates to
each rationing problem with ex-ante conditions (r, c, δ) ∈ RN , where N ∈ N ,
a unique allocation x = F (r, c, δ) = (F1(r, c, δ), F2(r, c, δ), . . . , Fn(r, c, δ)) ∈
RN+ such that
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• ∑i∈N xi = r (efficiency) and
• 0 ≤ xi ≤ ci, for all i ∈ N.
Next, we extend the CEA rule to this new framework.
Definition 5. (Generalized equal awards rule, GEA). For any (r, c, δ) ∈
RN , where N ∈ N , the GEA rule is defined as3
GEAi(r, c, δ) = min {ci, (λ− δi)+} , for all i ∈ N,
where λ ∈ R satisfies ∑i∈N GEAi(r, c, δ) = r.
Notice that the GEA rule is well defined. Indeed, by applying Bolzano’s
Theorem to the continuous function
ϕ(λ) =
∑
i∈N
ϕi(λ) =
∑
i∈N
min {ci, (λ− δi)+} ,
the existence of a value λ, such that ϕ(λ) = r, is guaranteed since
ϕ
(
min
i∈N
{δi}
)
= 0 ≤ r ≤ ϕ
(
max
i∈N
{ci + δi}
)
=
∑
i∈N
ci.
Moreover, let us suppose that there exist λ, λ′ ∈ R, with λ < λ′, such that
ϕ(λ) = ϕ(λ′) = r. As the reader may verify, ϕk(λ) is a non-decreasing
function for all k ∈ N . Hence, we have that ϕk(λ) ≤ ϕk(λ′) for all k ∈ N .
Therefore, we obtain r =
∑
k∈N ϕk(λ) ≤
∑
k∈N ϕk(λ
′) = r and thus ϕk(λ) =
ϕk(λ
′) for all k ∈ N . We conclude that the solution is unique and so it is
well defined for all problems.4 Let us illustrate the application of the rule
with an example.
3From now on, we use the following notation: for all a ∈ R, (a)+ = max{0, a}.
4Notice that, in contrast to the standard rationing problems, when r <
∑
i∈N ci, the
value of λ in the formula of the GEA rule might not be unique. For instance, in the two-
person problem (r, c, δ) = (2, (2, 2), (0, 3)) the unique solution is GEA(2, (2, 2), (0, 3)) =
(2, 0) but λ ∈ [2, 3].
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Example 1. Consider the three-person rationing problem
(r, (c1, c2, c3), (δ1, δ2, δ3)) = (3, (2.5, 3, 2.5), (0, 1.5, 4.5)).
The allocation assigned by the GEA rule is GEA(r, c, δ) = (2.25, 0.75, 0)
where λ takes the value 2.25 in the formula, as the reader may check. Inspired
by the hydraulic representation of rationing rules given by Kaminski (2000)
(see Figure 1), a dynamic interpretation of how this rule assigns awards is
as follows.
Figure 1: Equalizing awards with ex-ante conditions.
Agent 1, the one with the lowest ex-ante condition, is the first agent to
be assigned awards. Thus, agent 1 receives δ
2
− δ
1
= 1.5 units of resource in
order to compensate the inequality in the ex-ante conditions with respect to
the agent with the second lowest ex-ante condition. At this point there are
still 1.5 units left to be distributed. Finally, agents 1 and 2 share equally this
amount (0.75 units each) and agent 3 does not receive anything. This holds
sinc neither ag nt 1, no agent 2 have bee fully co pensated with respect
to agent 3. We finally obtain the distribution (2.25, 0.75, 0).
Let us remark that the values of the ex-ante conditions are not allocated.
Indeed, what is relevant is not the numerical value of the ex-ante condition
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of an agent, but the difference between its value and the respective values of
ex-ante conditions of the rest of agents. Specifically, as the above example
shows, bilateral compensations are induced by the inequalities in the ex-ante
conditions between any pair of agents.
Obviously, the GEA rule generalizes the CEA rule. In other words, the
allocation assigned by the GEA rule when applied to a problem without
inequalities in ex-ante conditions coincides with the allocation of the CEA
rule applied to the corresponding standard rationing problem (without ex-
ante conditions), that is, if δ = (α, α, . . . , α) ∈ RN , then GEA(r, c, δ) =
CEA(r, c).
In standard rationing problems, the CEA rule seeks to minimize the
differences between the payoff of agents. Therefore, if there is a differ-
ence between the payoff of two agents i, j ∈ N with i 6= j it is because
the agent with the smallest payoff has received all his claim: that is, if
CEAi(r, c) < CEAj(r, c), then CEAi(r, c) = ci. This principle can be
extended to rationing problems with ex-ante conditions by minimizing the
differences between the payoff plus the corresponding ex-ante condition of
agents. This feature of the GEA rule is used later and it is crucial to prove
Theorems 1 and 2. The proof of the next proposition can be found in Ap-
pendix B in the supplementary material.
Proposition 1. Let (r, c, δ) ∈ RN , N ∈ N , and let x∗ ∈ RN+ be such that
x∗i ≤ ci, for all i ∈ N , and
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = r. The following statements are
equivalent:
1. x∗ = GEA(r, c, δ).
2. For all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, if x∗i + δi < x∗j + δj, then either x∗j = 0,
or x∗i = ci.
Now, we extend the idea of equalizing losses to rationing problems with
ex-ante conditions. An agent’s loss is the difference between his claim and
his assigned payoff. If an agent has a better ex-ante condition than another,
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then he may suffer a higher loss compared to this other agent. We define the
generalized equal losses rule as follows:
Definition 6. (Generalized equal losses rule, GEL). For any (r, c, δ) ∈ RN ,
where N ∈ N , the GEL rule is defined as
GELi(r, c, δ) = max {0, ci − (λ+ δi)+} , for all i ∈ N,
where λ ∈ R satisfies ∑i∈N GELi(r, c, δ) = r.
The GEL rule assigns losses in an egalitarian way, but taking into account
that no agent can receive a negative payoff and that the differences among
ex-ante conditions might induce bilateral compensations of losses between
agents. The reader may check that the GEL rule is well defined by using
similar arguments to those for the case of the GEA rule.
Analogously to the case of equalizing awards, the GEL rule generalizes
the CEL rule; that is, if δ = (α, α, . . . , α) ∈ RN , then GEL(r, c, δ) =
CEL(r, c). Let us illustrate the application of the GEL rule with an ex-
ample.
Example 2. Consider the rationing problem with ex-ante conditions given
in Example 1, (r, c, δ) = (3, (2.5, 3, 2.5), (0, 1.5, 4.5)). The allocation assigned
by the GEL rule is GEL(r, c, δ) = (2, 1, 0), where λ = 0.5. A dynamic
interpretation of how this rule assigns losses is as follows. Notice that the
total loss is c1+c2+c3−r = 5. Agent 3 is the first agent to be assigned losses
since he has the largest ex-ante condition. In the first step, this agent suffers
the maximum loss, all his claim, since the amount that he claims is not
enough to compensate the difference between his own ex-ante condition and
the second highest ex-ante condition, i.e. c3 = 2.5 < δ3−δ2 = 3. At this point
there are still 2.5 units of losses left to be allocated. In the next step, 1.5 units
of losses are assigned to agent 2 in order to fully compensate the difference
between ex-ante conditions, i.e. δ2− δ1 = 1.5. Finally, the remaining unit of
loss is equally divided between both agents. Therefore, the losses allocation is
(0.5, 2, 2.5) and so the assigned payoff vector is (c1 − 0.5, c2 − 2, c3 − 2.5) =
(2, 1, 0).
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3 Axiomatic characterizations of the GEA
In this section we provide two characterizations of the GEA rule. The first
one extends a well-known characterization of the CEA rule. The second one
is new and proposes specific properties for this model.
The CEA and the CEL rules (for standard rationing problems) have
been characterized in several studies (see the surveys undertaken by Thom-
son (2003, 2015)). Herrero and Villar (2001) characterize the CEA rule by
means of three axioms: consistency, path-independence and exemption. In
this section, we characterize the GEA rule inspired by these axioms. Specifi-
cally, we adapt the properties of consistency and path-independence, and we
introduce a new property, ex-ante exemption.
Path-independence states that if we apply a rule to a problem but the
available amount of resource diminishes suddenly, the new allocation ob-
tained by applying once again the same rule (to the new amount and with
the original claims) is equal to the one obtained when using the previous
allocation as claims. This property was first suggested by Plott (1973) for
choice functions, and by Kalai (1977) in the theory of axiomatic bargaining.
Moreover, the property was originally introduced in the context of standard
rationing problems by Moulin (1987).
Definition 7. A generalized rationing rule F satisfies path-independence if
for all N ∈ N and all (r, c, δ) ∈ RN with ∑i∈N ci ≥ r′ ≥ r it holds
F (r, c, δ) = F (r, F (r′, c, δ), δ).
Because of claim boundedness (see Definition 4), if a rule satisfies path-
independence, then it is monotonic with respect to r. That is, for all N ∈ N ,
all c ∈ RN+ and all r, r′ :
{r ≤ r′ ≤
∑
i∈N
ci} ⇒ {F (r, c, δ) ≤ F (r′, c, δ)}. (1)
This property is known as resource monotonicity.
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Consistency is a property that requires that when we re-evaluate the
resource allocation within a subgroup of agents using the same rule, the
allocation should not change. To define this property we use the following
notation. Given a vector x ∈ RN and a subset S ⊆ N , we denote by x|S ∈ RS
the vector x restricted to the members of S.
Definition 8. A generalized rationing rule F is consistent if for all (r, c, δ) ∈
RN , all N ∈ N and all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, it holds
F (r, c, δ)|T = F
(
r −
∑
i∈N\T
Fi(r, c, δ), c|T , δ|T
)
.
Before defining ex-ante exemption, let us remark that in the standard
rationing framework, exemption is a property that ensures that an agent
with a small enough claim will not suffer from rationing. Specifically, for
the two-person case N = {i, j}, a solution (xi, xj) = F (r, (ci, cj)) satisfies
exemption if xk = ck whenever ck ≤ r2 for some k ∈ N .
The application of exemption to our framework needs to take into ac-
count ex-ante conditions, and only applies to two-person problems. Ex-ante
exemption states that an agent with a small enough maximum final stock
(the initial stock plus the claim truncated by the amount of resource) must
not be rationed.
Definition 9. A generalized rationing rule F satisfies ex-ante exemption if
for any two-person rationing problem with ex-ante conditions (r, c, δ) ∈ RN ,
with N = {i, j}, it holds that
if min{r, ci}+ δi ≤ r + δi + δj
2
then Fi(r, c, δ) = min{r, ci}.
Notice that, if there are no ex-ante inequalities between agents (δi = δj)
this is the classical exemption property for the two-person case. The next
proposition states that the GEA rule satisfies all these properties. The rather
technical proof is provided in Appendix B in the supplementary material.
Proposition 2. The GEA rule satisfies path-independence, consistency and
ex-ante exemption.
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Now, we state our first characterization result. The proof can be found
in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. The GEA is the unique rule that satisfies path-independence,
ex-ante exemption and consistency.
The properties in Theorem 1 are independent as the reader can verify in
Examples 3, 4 and 5 in Appendix A.
Now, we carry out another characterization for this rule. This new char-
acterization is based on specific properties for the ex-ante conditions frame-
work, namely ex-ante fairness and transfer composition. Let us define these
properties.
Ex-ante fairness is applied to any pair of agents that exhibits differences
in ex-ante conditions. It states that if the available amount of resource is not
large enough to fully compensate the poorest agent in the pair (the one with
the worst ex-ante condition), then the richest agent must get nothing. This
property guarantees that social inequalities will not increase.
Definition 10. A generalized rationing rule F satisfies ex-ante fairness if
for all N ∈ N , all (r, c, δ) ∈ RN and all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, it holds that
if r ≤ min{δj − δi, ci} then Fj(r, c, δ) = 0.
Transfer composition states that the result of allocating directly the avail-
able amount of resource is the same than first distributing a smaller amount
and, after that, distributing the remaining quantity in a new problem where
the claim of each agent is diminished by the amount initially received and
the ex-ante condition is augmented by the same amount. Part of the claim
is received as payoff in the first allocation and transferred as stock in the
second problem.
Definition 11. A generalized rationing rule F satisfies transfer composition
if for all N ∈ N , all (r, c, δ) ∈ RN and all r1, r2 ∈ R+ such that r1 + r2 = r,
it holds
F (r, c, δ) = F (r1, c, δ) + F (r2, c− F (r1, c, δ), δ + F (r1, c, δ)).
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The GEA rule satisfies both ex-ante fairness and transfer composition.
The proof of this result can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 3. The GEA rule satisfies transfer composition and ex-ante
fairness.
In fact, these two properties characterize the GEA rule.
Theorem 2. The GEA is the unique rule that satisfies ex-ante fairness and
transfer composition.
Proof. By Proposition 3, we know that the GEA rule satisfies ex-ante fairness
and transfer composition. Next, we show uniqueness. Let F be a rule satis-
fying these properties, but suppose on the contrary that F 6= GEA. Hence,
there exists a rationing problem with ex-ante conditions (r, c, δ) ∈ RN such
that x = F (r, c, δ) 6= GEA(r, c, δ). Then, by Proposition 1, there exist
i, j ∈ N such that xi + δi < xj + δj with xi < ci and xj > 0.
Let us remark that transfer composition implies resource monotonicity
(see (1)). Hence, F is a continuous and increasing function in r. Thus,
for all r′ ∈ [0, r], we have that x ≥ F (r′, c, δ). Take α∗ ∈ (0, r] such that
Fj(α
∗, c, δ) = xj and Fj(α, c, δ) < xj for all α ∈ [0, α∗). Moreover, let
α̂ ∈ (0, α∗) such that
0 < α∗ − α̂ ≤ min
{
xj + δj − (xi + δi)
2
, ci − xi
}
. (2)
Notice that α∗ − α̂ < r. Let us denote z∗ = F (α∗, c, δ) and ẑ = F (α̂, c, δ).
By transfer composition, we have that
z∗ = ẑ + F (α∗ − α̂, c− ẑ, δ + ẑ). (3)
Let us denote z′ = F (α∗− α̂, c− ẑ, δ+ ẑ). Taking into account the definition
of α∗, expression (3) and since α̂ < α∗, we obtain
x ≥ z∗ ≥ ẑ and, in particular, xj = z∗j > ẑj. (4)
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Making use of (2) and (4), we have that
2 · (α∗ − α̂) ≤ xj + δj − (xi + δi) ≤ z∗j + δj − (z∗i + δi)
= ẑj + δj − (ẑi + δi) + (z∗j − ẑj)− (z∗i − ẑi)
≤ ẑj + δj − (ẑi + δi) +
∑
k∈N(z
∗
k − ẑk)
= ẑj + δj − (ẑi + δi) + α∗ − α̂,
which implies α∗− α̂ ≤ (ẑj +δj)−(ẑi+δi). Moreover, by (2) and (4), we have
that α∗− α̂ ≤ ci−xi ≤ ci− z∗i ≤ ci− ẑi. Therefore, α∗− α̂ ≤ min{(ẑj + δj)−
(ẑi + δi), ci − ẑi}. Then, by ex-ante fairness, it holds that z′j = 0. However,
by (3) and (4), we reach a contradiction since xj = z
∗
j = ẑj + z
′
j = ẑj < xj.
Therefore, we conclude that F = GEA and thus the GEA is the unique
rule that satisfies ex-ante fairness and transfer composition.
The properties in Theorem 2 are logically independent. The rule F 1
defined as F 1(r, c, δ) = CEA(r, c) satisfies transfer-composition but not ex-
ante fairness. The priority rule with respect to ex-ante conditions F 2 satisfies
ex-ante fairness but not transfer composition. This rule is defined as follows.
Let {N1, N2, . . . , Nm} be a partition of the set N such that, for all r ∈
{1, . . . ,m − 1} it holds that δi < δj, for all i ∈ Nr and all j ∈ Nr+1. That
is, we divide N in m groups by the increasing value of ex-ante conditions.
Then, if k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is such that ∑k−1r=1∑j∈Nr cj < r ≤ ∑kr=1∑j∈Nr cj
then
F 2i (r, c, δ) =

ci if i ∈
⋃k−1
r=1 Nr,
GEAi
(
r −
k−1∑
r=1
∑
j∈Nr
cj, c|Nk , δ|Nk
)
if i ∈ Nk,
0 else.
It is interesting to point out that the GEA rule combines the principle
of equality, represented by F 1 and the idea of prioritizing agents with worse
ex-ante conditions, represented by F 2.
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Remark 1. Since the GEA rule satisfies consistency, it follows that ex-ante
fairness and transfer composition imply consistency.
4 Axiomatic characterizations of the GEL
In the standard rationing framework, the CEA and the CEL are dual
rules. This means that one rule distributes the total gain r, in the pri-
mal problem (r, c), in the same way as the other rule distributes the total
loss ` =
∑
i∈N ci − r, in the dual problem (`, c). Herrero and Villar (2001)
connect the properties that characterize a rule for a standard rationing prob-
lem with the dual properties5 that characterize the corresponding dual rule.
They state that if a rule is characterized by some properties, its dual rule is
characterized by the corresponding dual properties (see Theorem 0 in Herrero
and Villar, 2001).
The idea of duality can be adapted for rationing problems with ex-ante
conditions but taking into account that the vector δ, which represents the ex-
ante conditions, becomes −δ when passing from the primal problem (r, c, δ)
to the dual problem (`, c,−δ).
Definition 12. F ∗ is the dual rule of F if, for all N ∈ N and all (r, c, δ) ∈
RN ,
F ∗(r, c, δ) = c− F (`, c,−δ),
where ` =
∑
i∈N ci − r.
The duality of the GEA rule and the GEL rule is maintained as it occurs
for the duality between the CEA rule and the CEL rule in the standard
framework.
Proposition 4. The GEA and the GEL are dual rules of each other.
5A property satisfied by a rule is dual of another property if and only if this last
property is satisfied by the corresponding dual rule.
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Proof. Let us first prove GEA(r, c, δ) = c−GEL(`, c,−δ). For all i ∈ N ,
GEAi(r, c, δ) = min{ci, (λ− δi)+} = ci −max{0, ci − (λ− δi)+}. (5)
By (5),
∑
i∈N GEAi(r, c, δ) =
∑
i∈N ci−
∑
i∈N max{0, ci− (λ− δi)+} and
thus,
∑
i∈N max{0, ci − (λ − δi)+} =
∑
i∈N ci − r = `. Hence, max{0, ci −
(λ−δi)+} = GELi(`, c,−δ). Next we prove GEL(r, c, δ) = c−GEA(`, c,−δ).
For all i ∈ N ,
GELi(r, c, δ) = max{0, ci − (λ+ δi)+} = ci −min{ci, (λ+ δi)+}. (6)
By (6),
∑
i∈N GELi(r, c, δ) =
∑
i∈N ci −
∑
i∈N min{ci, (λ+ δi)+} and∑
i∈N min{ci, (λ + δi)+} =
∑
i∈N ci − r = `. Hence, min{ci, (λ + δi)+} =
GEAi(`, c,−δ).
Using the duality approach it suffices to provide dual properties of those
that characterize the GEA rule in order to characterize the GEL rule. The
dual property of ex-ante exemption is ex-ante exclusion (for the proof see
Appendix B in the supplementary material).
Definition 13. A generalized rationing rule F satisfies ex-ante exclusion if
for any two-person rationing problem with ex-ante conditions (r, c, δ) ∈ RN ,
with N = {i, j}, it holds that
if min{`, ci} − δi ≤ `− δi − δj
2
then Fi(r, c, δ) = (r − cj)+.
This property only applies to the two-person case and it states that if the
maximum loss that an agent can assume is small enough, after discounting
his initial stock of resource available to cover this loss, then this agent must
be assigned with the maximum possible loss.
Parallel to standard rationing problems (without ex-ante conditions), the
dual property of path-independence is composition (for the proof see Ap-
pendix B in the supplementary material).
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Definition 14. A generalized rationing rule F satisfies composition if for
all N ∈ N , all (r, c, δ) ∈ RN and all r1, r2 ∈ R+ such that r1 + r2 = r, it
holds
F (r, c, δ) = F (r1, c, δ) + F (r2, c− F (r1, c, δ), δ).
The dual property of ex-ante fairness is ex-ante fairness* (for the proof
see Appendix B in the supplementary material).
Definition 15. A generalized rationing rule F satisfies ex-ante fairness* if
for all N ∈ N , all (r, c, δ) ∈ RN and all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, it holds that
if ` ≤ min{δj − δi, cj} then Fi(r, c, δ) = ci.
Ex-ante fairness* applies to any pair of agents that exhibits differences in
ex-ante conditions. It states that if the total loss is so small that, even in the
case of assigning all the loss to the richest agent in the pair, the difference
in ex-ante conditions between both agents does not vanish, then the poorest
agent will not suffer any loss.
The dual property of transfer composition is transfer path independence
(for the proof see Appendix B in the supplementary material).
Definition 16. A generalized rationing rule F satisfies transfer path inde-
pendence if for all N ∈ N and all (r, c, δ) ∈ RN with ∑i∈N ci ≥ r′ ≥ r it
holds
F (r, c, δ) = F
(
r, F (r′, c, δ), δ −
(
c− F (r′, c, δ)
))
.
Suppose that we compute the solution of a rationing problem with ex-
ante conditions; each agent is assigned gains but also suffers a loss from his
claim. Imagine that the amount of resource diminishes suddenly. Transfer
path-independence states that the allocation does not change if we take as
claims the former allocation and we diminish the stock of each agent by the
loss suffered in the former allocation. Assigned losses in the former allocation
are transferred to the second problem by diminishing ex-ante conditions.
Once we have defined the dual properties of those that characterize the
GEA rule, Theorem 0 of Herrero and Villar (2001) can be applied directly
to characterize the GEL rule.
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Theorem 3. The GEL is the unique rule that satisfies composition, ex-ante
exclusion and consistency.
Theorem 4. The GEL is the unique rule that satisfies ex-ante fairness* and
transfer path-independence.
5 Conclusions
We have presented an extension of the standard rationing model. The aim
of this extension is to take into account ex-ante inequalities between agents
involved in the rationing process and to try to compensate them for these
inequalities. Two of the principal rationing rules (equal gains and equal
losses) have been generalized and characterized within this new framework.
As we have previously mentioned in the Introduction, Hougaard et al.
(2013a) propose an extension of the standard rationing model but from a
different point of view. They consider a vector of baselines b = (bi)i=1,...,n,
where bi is interpreted as a tentative allocation for agent i. Moreover, they
denote by ti = min{ci, bi} the corresponding truncated baseline. These au-
thors use the CEA rule in the baselines model as follows:
C˜EA(r, c, b) =
 t+ CEA
(
r −∑i∈N ti, c− t) if ∑i∈N ti ≤ r
t− CEA
(∑
i∈N ti − r, t
)
if
∑
i∈N ti > r
.
That is, the allocation is made in a two-step process: first, truncated baselines
are assigned and, after that, the surplus or the deficit with respect to the
available amount of resource is shared equally.
We would like to point out that baselines and ex-ante conditions are of
a completely different nature and cannot be directly identified each other.
In contrast to the baselines that are preassigned, the stocks of resource or
ex-ante conditions are not redistributed in any case. Thus, the final stock
of any agent (initial stock plus the amount received) cannot be smaller than
his initial stock (ex-ante condition). In Hougaard’s model, the baseline of an
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agent is just an objective evaluation of his actual needs. Indeed, the agent
may end with an allocation above or below his baseline (baselines act as
bounds). However, when using the extension of the CEA rule, there is a link
that allows to reinterpret a problem with baselines as a problem with ex-ante
conditions. If we take δ∗ = −t, then C˜EA(r, c, b) = GEA(r, c, δ∗). Notice
that the truncated baselines are embedded in our model as debts to agents
and thus they are represented by a negative value. On the other way around,
that is, defining a problem with baselines based upon a problem with ex-ante
conditions such that the allocations in both models coincides, is not possible
in a non-trivial way.6
Our model can be also viewed as a situation where some priority is given
to some agents and where asymmetric allocations arise. Indeed, the model we
introduce allows to combine full and partial priority between agents.7 Asym-
metric allocations were previously analysed in Moulin (2000) or in Hokari and
Thomson (2003). Moulin assigns weights to agents and distributes awards
or losses (up to the value of the claims) proportionally with respect to the
weights. He also combines these weighted solutions with full priority rules.
In our approach, the asymmetries are induced by the ex-ante conditions but
not by the rules we apply which preserve the idea of equal (gains or losses)
distribution.
6Notice that if we consider the three-person problem (r, c, δ) = (2.5, (2, 1, 1), (0, 2, 3)),
GEA(r, c, δ) = (2, 0.5, 0). For this problem, the reader may check that the only way to
define a problem with baselines (2.5, (2, 1, 1), b) such that C˜EA(2.5, (2, 1, 1), b) = (2, 0.5, 0)
is by taking t = GEA(r, c, δ) which implies beforehand to know the allocation proposed
by the GEA. Even in the variant of the model proposed by the same authors (Hougaard
et al., 2013b), the unique compatible baselines for this problem is also to take the trivial
option b = (2, 0.5, 0) = GEA(r, c, δ).
It can also be checked that the same example shows that the GEL allocation cannot be
reached by the baselines extension of the CEL rule.
7Kaminski (2006) considers priority in bankruptcy situations assigning to different cat-
egories of claimants lexicographic full priorities. Furthermore, there is an extensive liter-
ature on bankruptcy laws discussing the insertion of partial priority in bankruptcy codes
(e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 1996; Bergstro¨m et al., 2004; Warren, 1997).
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Some final remarks might inspire future research. First, it would be
interesting to also adapt some characterizations of the CEA and the CEL
rules provided in the literature (see Thomson (2003, 2015)) to our framework.
Secondly, there are two important rationing rules that have not yet been
analysed in our new framework: the Talmudic rule and the proportional
rule. Thirdly, we think our model might be applied to allocate resources in
other different contexts. For instance, in a context in which a same group
of agents faces a sequence of rationing problems at different periods of time.
The distribution in the current period is influenced by the amount received
in previous periods, that can be considered as an ex-ante condition for the
current rationing problem. Finally, inequalities in the ex-ante conditions
might be also useful to analyse taxation problems when differences in net
wealth of agents are relevant in the final allocation of taxes.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1 By Proposition 2, we know that the GEA rule satis-
fies path-independence, consistency and ex-ante exemption. Next, we show
uniqueness. Let F be a rule satisfying these properties. If |N | = 1, it is
straightforward. Consider now the two-person case N = {1, 2} and (r, c, δ) ∈
R{1,2}. Let us suppose that, w.l.o.g., δ1 ≤ δ2 and denote x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) =
F (r, c, δ). We consider three cases:
Case 1: r ≤ δ2 − δ1. Then,
min{r, c1} ≤ r = r
2
+
r
2
≤ r − (δ1 − δ2)
2
.
Hence, min{r, c1} + δ1 ≤ r+δ1+δ22 , and thus, by ex-ante exemption, we have
that x∗1 = min{r, c1} and x∗2 = (r − c1)+, and the solution F is uniquely
determined.
Case 2: r > δ2 − δ1 ≥ c1. Then,
min{r, c1} = c1 ≤ δ2 − δ1 = δ2 − δ1
2
+
δ2 − δ1
2
<
r − (δ1 − δ2)
2
.
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Hence, by ex-ante exemption, we have that x∗1 = min{r, c1} = c1 and x∗2 =
r − c1, and the solution F is also uniquely determined.
Case 3: r > δ2 − δ1 and c1 > δ2 − δ1. We consider two subcases:
Subcase 3.a: c1 + δ1 = c2 + δ2. Since r > δ2 − δ1, we claim that x∗1 + δ1 =
x∗2 + δ2. First, suppose on the contrary that
x∗1 + δ1 < x
∗
2 + δ2. (7)
From (7), it comes that x∗1 + δ1 <
x∗1+δ1+x
∗
2+δ2
2
= r+δ1+δ2
2
and thus
x∗1 = F1(r, c, δ) <
r + δ2 − δ1
2
. (8)
Now, let us prove that there exists r′ > r such that F1(r′, c, δ) = r+δ2−δ12 .
Notice that r+δ2−δ1
2
> 0 since x∗1 ≥ 0. Moreover, r+δ2−δ12 ≤ c1 since c1 +
δ1 = c2 + δ2. Since F satisfies path-independence it also satisfies resource
monotonicity (see (1)). Hence, F is a continuous and increasing function
in r. Therefore, by continuity, since F1(0, c, δ) = 0, F1(c1 + c2, c, δ) = c1
and F is an increasing function in r, there exists r′ ∈ [0, c1 + c2] such that
F1(r
′, c, δ) = r+δ2−δ1
2
. Now, by (8), we have F1(r, c, δ) < F1(r
′, c, δ). Hence,
by resource monotonicity, we conclude r′ > r.
Next, let us denote x′ = F (r′, c, δ). Notice that min{r, x′1} ≤ x′1 =
r−(δ1−δ2)
2
which implies, by ex-ante exemption applied to the problem (r, x′, δ),
that F1(r, x
′, δ) = min{r, x′1} = min{r, r+δ2−δ12 } = r+δ2−δ12 , where the last
equality follows from r > δ2 − δ1. Finally, by path-independence, we obtain
x∗ = F (r, c, δ) = F (r, F (r′, c, δ), δ) =
(
r + δ2 − δ1
2
,
r + δ1 − δ2
2
)
.
We conclude that x∗1 + δ1 =
r+δ1+δ2
2
= x∗2 + δ2 reaching a contradiction.
In case x∗1 + δ1 > x
∗
2 + δ2 the proof follows the same argument to reach
also a contradiction. Hence, the proof of the claim is done. Finally, taking
into account that x∗1 + x
∗
2 = r, we conclude that the solution F is uniquely
determined.
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Subcase 3.b: c1 + δ1 6= c2 + δ2. First, if min{r, c1} + δ1 ≤ r+δ1+δ22 , then
by ex-ante exemption x∗1 = min{r, c1} and x∗2 = (r − c1)+, and the solution
F is uniquely determined. Similarly, if min{r, c2} + δ2 ≤ r+δ2+δ12 , then by
ex-ante exemption x∗2 = min{r, c2} and x∗1 = (r− c2)+, and the solution F is
uniquely determined. Otherwise,
min{r, ci}+ δi > r + δ1 + δ2
2
, for all i ∈ {1, 2}. (9)
By the hypothesis of Subcase 3.b
ci + δi < cj + δj, where i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. (10)
Now we claim that for r′ = 2ci + δi − δj, we have that x′ = F (r′, c, δ) is
such that x′i = ci and x
′
j = ci + δi − δj. To verify this, first notice that, by
(10), r′ < ci + cj. Moreover, we show that ci + δi − δj ≥ 0. Suppose on the
contrary that ci < δj − δi. If i = 1 and j = 2, we obtain a contradiction
with the hypothesis of Case 3; if i = 2 and j = 1 then c2 < δ1 − δ2 ≤ 0,
getting again a contradiction. Notice that the second inequality follows from
the assumption δ1 ≤ δ2.
Now, since ci + δi − δj ≥ 0, we have
min{r′, ci}+ δi = min{2ci + δi − δj, ci}+ δi = ci + δi = r
′ + δi + δj
2
,
and so min{r′, ci} = r
′−(δi−δj)
2
= ci. Hence, by ex-ante exemption, we have
that x′i = ci and, by efficiency, x
′
j = r
′ − x′i = ci + δi − δj, and the proof of
the claim is done.
On the other hand, r′ = 2ci+δi−δj ≥ 2 min{r, ci}+δi−δj > r, where the
last inequality follows from (9). Therefore, by path-independence, we obtain
F (r, c, δ) = F (r, F (r′, c, δ), δ) = F (r, x′, δ).
Finally, since x′j+δj = ci+δi = x
′
i+δi and r > δ2−δ1, where the inequality
comes from the hypothesis of Case 3, applying an analogous reasoning to the
one of Subcase 3.a to the problem (r, x′, δ) we obtain
Fi(r, c, δ) + δi = Fi(r, x
′, δ) + δi = Fj(r, x′, δ) + δj = Fj(r, c, δ) + δj,
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where the first and the last equalities come from path-independence. Hence,
by efficiency, the solution F is uniquely determined. Therefore, we conclude
that, for the two-person case, the GEA rule is the unique rule that satisfies
path-independence and ex-ante exemption.
Let |N | ≥ 3 and suppose that F and F ′ satisfy the three properties,
but F 6= F ′. Hence, there exists (r, c, δ) ∈ RN such that x = F (r, c, δ) 6=
F ′(r, c, δ) = x′. This means that there exist i, j ∈ N such that xi > x′i,
xj < x
′
j and, w.l.o.g., xi + xj ≤ x′i + x′j. However, since F and F ′ are
consistent,
(xi, xj) = F (r −
∑
k∈N\{i,j} xk, (ci, cj), (δi, δj)) and
(x′i, x
′
j) = F
′(r −∑k∈N\{i,j} x′k, (ci, cj), (δi, δj)).
Since F = F ′ for the two-person case and path-independence implies
resource monotonicity, we have that
(x′i, x
′
j) = F
′(x′i + x
′
j, (ci, cj)(δi, δj)) = F (x
′
i + x
′
j, (ci, cj)(δi, δj))
≥ F (xi + xj, (ci, cj)(δi, δj)) = (xi, xj),
in contradiction with xi > x
′
i. Hence, we conclude that F = F
′ = GEA.

Example 3. A rule F that satisfies consistency and path-independence but
does not satisfy ex-ante exemption. Let F be a generalized rationing rule
defined as follows, for all (r, c, δ) ∈ RN , N ∈ N , we have
F (r, c, δ) = GEA (r, c,0) .
♦
Example 4. A rule F that satisfies consistency and ex-ante exemption but
does not satisfy path-independence. Let (r, c, δ) ∈ RN , N ∈ N , and let us
denote by ĉi = min{r, ci} the truncated claim of agent i ∈ N . Up to reordering
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agents, there exist natural numbers k1, k2, . . . , km such that k1+k2+. . .+km =
n and
ĉ1 + δ1 = ĉ2 + δ2 = . . . = ĉk1 + δk1
< ĉk1+1 + δk1+1 = ĉk1+2 + δk1+2 = . . . = ĉk1+k2 + δk1+k2
< ĉk1+k2+1 + δk1+k2+1 = . . . = ĉk1+k2+k3 + δk1+k2+k3
...
< ĉk1+...+km−1+1 + δk1+...+km−1+1 = . . . = ĉk1+...+km + δk1+...+km .
Notice that we have divided agents in m groups according to the value ĉi +
δi, where this value is constant within groups and strictly increasing across
groups. Let us denote each group by N1 = {i ∈ N : 1 ≤ i ≤ k1} and
Nt = {i ∈ N : k1 + . . .+ kt−1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ k1 + . . .+ kt}, for all t ∈ {2, . . . ,m}.
Then, we can define recursively an allocation rule by assigning payoffs to the
members of each group as follows.
Step 1
(
group N1
)
:
If
∑
i∈N1 ci ≥ r then xi = GEAi(r, c|N1 , δ|N1), for all i ∈ N1, and xi = 0,
otherwise. Stop.
If not,
∑
i∈N1 ci < r, we assign xi = ci, for all i ∈ N1 and we proceed to
the next step.
Step t
(
2 ≤ t ≤ m, groups N2 to Nm
)
:
If
∑
i∈Nt
ci ≥ r −
∑
i∈Nj
j=1,...,t−1
ci then xi = GEAi
r − ∑
k∈Nj
j=1,...,t−1
ck, c|Nt , δ|Nt
,
for all i ∈ Nt, and xi = 0, for all i ∈ Nk with k = t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . ,m. Stop.
If not,
∑
i∈Nt
ci < r −
∑
i∈Nj
j=1,...,t−1
ci, we assign xi = ci, for all i ∈ Nt and we
proceed to the next step.
♦
Example 5. A rule F that satisfies ex-ante exemption and path independence
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but it is not consistent. Let N ∈ N with |N | ≥ 3. Define8 N1 = {i, j} ⊆ N
such that i < k and j < k for all k ∈ N \ {i, j} and N2 = N \ N1. Let
CN1 = ci + cj, CN2 =
∑
k∈N2 ck, ∆N1 = δi + δj, and ∆N2 =
∑
k∈N2 δk. Next,
let us denote by z = (z1, z2) the allocation obtained by applying the GEA rule
to the two-subgroup problem; that is
z = (z1, z2) = GEA (r, (CN1 , CN2), (∆N1 ,∆N2)) .
Then, define F as follows: if |N | ≤ 2, F (r, c, δ) = GEA(r, c, δ); if |N | ≥ 3
Fk(r, c, δ) =
 GEAk (z1, (ci, cj), (δi, δj)) if k ∈ N1,GEAk (z2, (ck)k∈N2 , (δk)k∈N2) if k ∈ N2.
♦
Proof of Proposition 3 First, we prove transfer composition. If r = r1, the
result is straightforward. If r1 < r and r1 +r2 = r, we claim that x = x
′+x′′,
where x = GEA(r, c, δ), x′ = GEA(r1, c, δ) and x′′ = GEA(r2, c− x′, δ+ x′).
By definition, and for all i ∈ N , we have
xi = min{ci, (λ− δi)+} with
∑
k∈N xk = r,
x′i = min{ci, (λ′ − δi)+} with
∑
k∈N x
′
k = r1 and
x′′i = min
{
ci −min{ci, (λ′ − δi)+},
(
λ′′ − δi −min{ci, (λ′ − δi)+}
)
+
}
with
∑
k∈N x
′′
k = r2.
Moreover, notice that
x′i + x
′′
i = min
{
ci,max
{
λ′′ − δi,min{ci, (λ′ − δi)+}
}}
. (11)
Next, we show
λ > λ′. (12)
8That is, N1 is formed by the two agents associated to the smallest natural numbers
in N .
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Suppose on the contrary that λ ≤ λ′. Then, for all i ∈ N ,
xi = min{ci, (λ− δi)+} ≤ min{ci, (λ′ − δi)+} = x′i.
Summing up all the above inequalities, we obtain
r =
∑
i∈N
xi ≤
∑
i∈N
x′i = r1,
which contradicts r1 < r.
Let us suppose on the contrary that theGEA rule does not satisfy transfer
composition, that is, x 6= x′+x′′. Then, by efficiency of the GEA rule, there
exist i∗ ∈ N and j∗ ∈ N such that
xi∗ < x
′
i∗ + x
′′
i∗ and xj∗ > x
′
j∗ + x
′′
j∗ . (13)
Then, by (11), we have
xi∗ = min{ci∗ , (λ− δi∗)+}
< min
{
ci∗ ,max
{
λ′′ − δi∗ ,min{ci∗ , (λ′ − δi∗)+}
}}
= x′i∗ + x
′′
i∗ ≤ ci∗ ,
(14)
which leads to xi∗ = min{ci∗ , (λ − δi∗)+} = (λ − δi∗)+. Taking this into
account, and substituting in (14), we have
xi∗ = (λ− δi∗)+ < min
{
ci∗ ,max
{
λ′′ − δi∗ ,min{ci∗ , (λ′ − δi∗)+}
}}
≤ max
{
λ′′ − δi∗ ,min{ci∗ , (λ′ − δi∗)+}
}
≤ max
{
λ′′ − δi∗ , (λ′ − δi∗)+
}
.
(15)
Next, we show that
λ′′ > λ. (16)
Otherwise, λ′′ ≤ λ and thus, by (12), we have that
max
{
λ′′ − δi∗ , (λ′ − δi∗)+
}
≤ (λ− δi∗)+ = xi∗ ,
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getting a contradiction with (15). Now, by (16) and (11), we obtain that, for
all j ∈ N \ {i∗},
xj = min{cj, (λ− δj)+}
≤ min
{
cj,max
{
λ′′ − δj,min{cj, (λ′ − δj)+}
}}
= x′j + x
′′
j .
However, this contradicts (13) and we conclude x = x′+x′′, which proves
that the GEA rule satisfies transfer composition.
Next, we prove ex-ante fairness. If r = 0, the result is straightforward.
Let (r, c, δ) ∈ RN , r > 0 and let x = GEA(r, c, δ). Suppose on the contrary
that there exist i, j ∈ N such that r ≤ min{δj− δi, ci} but xj > 0. Hence, by
efficiency of the GEA rule, we obtain that xi < ci, and thus, since xj > 0,
δj − δi ≥ min{δj − δi, ci} ≥ r =
∑
k∈N
xk ≥ xi + xj > xi − xj,
we conclude xi + δi < xj + δj with xj > 0 and xi < ci getting a contradiction
with Proposition 1. Therefore, we conclude that the GEA rule satisfies ex-
ante fairness.

Appendix B. Supplementary material
Proposition 1 Let (r, c, δ) ∈ RN , N ∈ N , and let x∗ ∈ RN+ be such that
x∗i ≤ ci, for all i ∈ N , and
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = r. The following statements are
equivalent:
1. x∗ = GEA(r, c, δ).
2. For all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, if x∗i + δi < x∗j + δj, then either x∗j = 0,
or x∗i = ci.
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Proof. 1⇒ 2) Let us suppose that x∗ = GEA(r, c, δ) and there exist i, j ∈ N ,
such that x∗i + δi < x
∗
j + δj but x
∗
j > 0 and x
∗
i < ci. Hence, λ − δj > 0,
x∗i = (λ− δi)+, and so
x∗i + δi = (λ− δi)+ + δi ≥ λ ≥ min{cj + δj, λ}
= min{cj, λ− δj}+ δj = min{cj, (λ− δj)+}+ δj = x∗j + δj.
Hence, we reach a contradiction with the hypothesis x∗i + δi < x
∗
j + δj and
we conclude that either x∗i = ci, or x
∗
j = 0.
2 ⇒ 1) Let us suppose that for all i, j ∈ N with x∗i + δi < x∗j + δj, it holds
that either x∗j = 0, or x
∗
i = ci, but x
∗ 6= GEA(r, c, δ). Then, by efficiency,
there exist i, j ∈ N such that
0 ≤ x∗i < GEAi(r, c, δ) ≤ ci and cj ≥ x∗j > GEAj(r, c, δ) ≥ 0. (17)
This means that x∗i < ci, λ− δi > 0 and (λ− δj)+ < cj. However,
x∗j + δj > GEAj(r, c, δ) + δj = (λ− δj)+ + δj ≥ λ ≥ min{ci + δi, λ}
= min{ci, λ− δi}+ δi = GEAi(r, c, δ) + δi > x∗i + δi.
By assumption, it should hold that either x∗j = 0, or x
∗
i = ci, but this con-
tradicts (17). Hence we conclude that x∗ = GEA(r, c, δ).
Proposition 2 The GEA rule satisfies path-independence, consistency and
ex-ante exemption.
Proof. First, we prove path-independence. If r = r′, the result is straightfor-
ward. If r < r′, we claim that
GEA(r, c, δ) = GEA(r,GEA(r′, c, δ), δ).
By definition, and for all i ∈ N , we have
GEAi(r, c, δ) = min{ci, (λ− δi)+} with
∑
k∈N GEAk(r, c, δ) = r,
GEAi(r
′, c, δ) = min{ci, (λ′ − δi)+} with
∑
k∈N GEAk(r
′, c, δ) = r′ and
GEAi(r,GEA(r
′, c, δ), δ) = min{min{ci, (λ′ − δi)+}, (λ′′ − δi)+}
with
∑
k∈N GEAk(r,GEA(r
′, c, δ), δ) = r.
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First, we show
λ < λ′. (18)
Suppose on the contrary, that λ ≥ λ′. Then, for all i ∈ N ,
GEAi(r, c, δ) = min{ci, (λ− δi)+} ≥ min{ci, (λ′ − δi)+} = GEAi(r′, c, δ).
Summing up all the above inequalities, we obtain
r =
∑
i∈N
GEAi(r, c, δ) ≥
∑
i∈N
GEAi(r
′, c, δ) = r′,
which contradicts r < r′.
Let us suppose now that GEA(r, c, δ) 6= GEA(r,GEA(r′, c, δ), δ). Then,
by efficiency of the GEA rule, there exist i∗ ∈ N and j∗ ∈ N such that
GEAi∗(r, c, δ) < GEAi∗(r,GEA(r
′, c, δ), δ) and
GEAj∗(r, c, δ) > GEAj∗(r,GEA(r
′, c, δ), δ).
(19)
Then, we have
GEAi∗(r, c, δ) = min{ci∗ , (λ− δi∗)+}
< min{min{ci∗ , (λ′ − δi∗)+}, (λ′′ − δi∗)+}
= GEAi∗(r,GEA(r
′, c, δ), δ) ≤ ci∗ ,
(20)
which leads to min{ci∗ , (λ − δi∗)+} = (λ − δi∗)+. Taking this into account,
and substituting in (20), we have
(λ− δi∗)+ < min{min{ci∗ , (λ′ − δi∗)+}, (λ′′ − δi∗)+} ≤ (λ′′ − δi∗)+.
Hence, λ− δi∗ ≤ (λ− δi∗)+ < (λ′′ − δi∗)+ = λ′′ − δi∗ which implies
λ < λ′′. (21)
Combining (18) and (21) we obtain, for all j ∈ N \ {i∗},
GEAj(r, c, δ) = min{cj, (λ− δj)+}
≤ min{cj,min{(λ′ − δj)+, (λ′′ − δj)+}}
= min{min{cj, (λ′ − δj)+}, (λ′′ − δj)+}
= GEAj(r,GEA(r
′, c, δ), δ).
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However, this contradicts (19) and we obtain
GEA(r, c, δ) = GEA(r,GEA(r′, c, δ), δ),
which proves that the GEA rule satisfies path-independence.
Next, we prove consistency. Let (r, c, δ) ∈ RN and T ( N , with T 6= ∅.
Let us denote x∗ = GEA(r, c, δ). By Proposition 1 it holds that, for all
i, j ∈ T with i 6= j, if x∗i + δi < x∗j + δj, then either x∗j = 0, or x∗i = ci. Since
x∗|T is feasible in the reduced problem (r −
∑
i∈N\T x
∗
i , c|T , δ|T ) and again by
Proposition 1, we conclude that x∗|T = GEA(r −
∑
i∈N\T x
∗
i , c|T , δ|T ) which
proves consistency.
Finally, we prove ex-ante exemption. If r = 0, the result is straightforward.
Let (r, c, δ) ∈ R{i,j}, r > 0, be a two-person rationing problem with ex-
ante conditions and let x∗ = GEA(r, c, δ). Suppose on the contrary, that
w.l.o.g., min{r, ci} ≤ r−(δi−δj)2 but x∗i < min{r, ci}. Hence, by efficiency,
x∗j = r − x∗i > 0.
We consider two cases:
Case 1: r ≤ ci. In this case r ≤ r−(δi−δj)2 , or, equivalently,
r + δi ≤ δj and thus δj ≥ δi. (22)
Moreover, since x∗ = GEA(r, c, δ) and x∗i < ci, we have x
∗
i = min{ci, (λ −
δi)+} = (λ − δi)+ = λ − δi, since, otherwise, from (22) 0 > λ − δi ≥ λ − δj,
and then x∗j = 0, which implies a contradiction.
On the other hand, since x∗ = GEA(r, c, δ) and x∗j > 0, we get
0 < x∗j = min{cj, (λ− δj)+} = min{cj, λ− δj} ≤ λ− δj.
However, if λ− δj > 0 we would have that, by (22), λ > δj ≥ r+ δi and thus
r < λ− δi = x∗i which is a contradiction.
Case 2: r > ci. In this case, by hypothesis, we get
ci ≤ r − (δi − δj)
2
. (23)
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Since we are assuming that x∗i < ci < r, we have x
∗
i = min{ci, (λ−δi)+} =
(λ−δi)+. If λ−δi ≥ 0, then r = x∗i +x∗j = λ−δi+x∗j ≤ λ−δi+λ−δj, where
the last inequality follows from 0 < x∗j = min{cj, (λ−δj)+} = min{cj, λ−δj}.
Using this inequality in (23), we get ci ≤ λ− δi, which implies that x∗i = ci,
in contradiction with our hypothesis. On the other hand, if λ− δi < 0, then
x∗i = 0 and r = x
∗
j ≤ λ − δj. Hence r + δj ≤ λ and so, by substitution in
(23), we get ci ≤ λ−δi2 < 0, which is a contradiction.
We conclude that the GEA rule satisfies ex-ante exemption.
Proposition 5 Ex-ante exemption and ex-ante exclusion are dual properties.
Proof. Let (r, c, δ) ∈ R{1,2} be a two-person rationing problem with ex-
ante conditions and let us suppose that F and F ∗ are dual rules, that is,
F ∗(r, c, δ) = c − F (`, c,−δ). Hence, we claim that if F satisfies ex-ante ex-
emption, then F ∗ satisfies ex-ante exclusion. To verify this, suppose, w.l.o.g.,
that, for the problem (r, c, δ), we have
min{`, c1} − δ1 ≤ `− δ1 − δ2
2
. (24)
Notice that (24) is the same condition as that used in the definition of ex-ante
exemption when we apply rule F to the problem (`, c,−δ). Hence, since F
satisfies ex-ante exemption and by (24), we have
F ∗1 (r, c, δ) = c1 − F1(`, c,−δ) = c1 −min{c1, `} = max{0, c1 − `}
= max{0, c1 − (c1 + c2 − r)} = (r − c2)+,
which proves that F ∗ satisfies ex-ante exclusion.
Similarly, we claim that if F satisfies ex-ante exclusion, then F ∗ satisfies
ex-ante exemption. Let us suppose, w.l.o.g., that for the problem (r, c, δ), we
have
min{r, c1}+ δ1 ≤ r + δ1 + δ2
2
. (25)
Notice that (25) is the same condition as that used in the definition of ex-
ante exclusion when we apply rule F to the problem (`, c,−δ). Hence, since
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F satisfies ex-ante exclusion, we have that
F ∗1 (r, c, δ) = c1 − F1(`, c,−δ) = c1 − (`− c2)+
= c1 −max{0, `− c2} = min{c1, c1 + c2 − `} = min{c1, r},
which proves that F ∗ satisfies ex-ante exemption.
Proposition 6 Path-independence and composition are dual properties.
Proof. Let us suppose that F and F ∗are dual rules, that is, F ∗(r, c, δ) =
c − F (`, c,−δ). We claim that if F satisfies composition, then F ∗ satisfies
path-independence. To verify this, let r ≥ r1 ≥ 0 and define r2 = r − r1 and
`1 =
∑
i∈N ci − r1. Hence,
` =
∑
i∈N
ci − r = `1 − r2, and so `1 ≥ `. (26)
On the one hand, we have
F ∗(r1, c, δ) = c− F (`1, c,−δ) = c− (F (`, c,−δ) + F (r2, c− F (`, c,−δ),−δ))
= F ∗(r, c, δ)− F (r2, c− F (`, c,−δ),−δ), (27)
where the first and the last equalities follow from the definition of dual rule,
and the remaining equality follows from the composition property of F and
(26).
By definition of dual rule, we have
F ∗(r1, F ∗(r, c, δ), δ) = F ∗(r, c, δ)− F (r − r1, F ∗(r, c, δ),−δ)
= F ∗(r, c, δ)− F (r2, c− F (`, c,−δ),−δ).
(28)
Thus, taken into account (27) and (28), we conclude that F ∗ satisfies path-
independence.
Similarly, we claim that if F satisfies path-independence, then F ∗ satisfies
composition. To verify this, let r1 + r2 = r, where r1, r2 ∈ R+ and `1 =
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∑
i∈N ci− r1. Notice that `1 ≥ `. By path-independence and by definition of
dual rule, we have
F (`, c,−δ) = F (`, F (`1, c,−δ),−δ) = F (`1, c,−δ)− F ∗(r2, F (`1, c,−δ), δ).
(29)
Then, by definition of dual rule and by (29), we have
F ∗(r, c, δ) = c− F (`, c,−δ) = c− (F (`1, c,−δ)− F ∗(r2, F (`1, c,−δ), δ))
= F ∗(r1, c, δ) + F ∗(r2, F (`1, c,−δ), δ)
= F ∗(r1, c, δ) + F ∗(r2, c− F ∗(r1, c, δ), δ).
(30)
Therefore, F ∗ satisfies composition.
Proposition 7 Ex-ante fairness and ex-ante fairness* are dual properties.
Proof. Let (r, c, δ) ∈ RN and suppose that F and F ∗ are dual rules, that
is, F ∗(r, c, δ) = c− F (`, c,−δ). We claim that if F satisfies ex-ante fairness,
then F ∗ satisfies ex-ante fairness*. To verify this, suppose that, given (r, c, δ)
there exist i, j ∈ N such that
` ≤ min{δj − δi, cj}. (31)
Notice that (31) is the same condition as the one used in the definition
of ex-ante fairness when we apply rule F to the problem (`, c,−δ). Hence,
since F satisfies ex-ante fairness and by (31), we have
F ∗i (r, c, δ) = ci − Fi(`, c,−δ) = ci − 0 = ci,
which proves that F ∗ satisfies ex-ante fairness*.
Similarly, we claim that if F satisfies ex-ante fairness*, then F ∗ satisfies
ex-ante fairness. Let us suppose that, given (r, c, δ) there exist i, j ∈ N such
that
r ≤ min{δj − δi, ci}. (32)
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Notice that (32) is the same condition as the one used in the definition
of ex-ante fairness* when we apply rule F to the problem (`, c,−δ). Hence,
since F satisfies ex-ante fairness* and by (32), we have
F ∗j (r, c, δ) = cj − Fj(`, c,−δ) = cj − cj = 0,
which proves that F ∗ satisfies ex-ante fairness.
Proposition 8 Transfer composition and trasnfer path-independence are
dual properties.
Proof. The proof follows the same guidelines of the proof of Proposition
6. Just replace expression (30) by F ∗(r, c, δ) = F ∗(r1, c, δ) + F ∗(r2, c −
F ∗(r1, c, δ), δ + F ∗(r1, c, δ)).
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